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The use of offsets to mitigate biodiversity losses hasproliferated in recent years. Most of the approxi-
mately 51 schemes operating around the world have
emerged over the past 10 years (Figure 1). Increasingly,
more traditional systems for safeguarding biodiversity are
being discarded in favor of options that “trade nature”.
Offsetting policies seek to compensate for biodiversity
losses at an impact site by generating ecological gains
elsewhere (Maron et al. 2012). This increased flexibility is
intended to facilitate both economic development and
environmental protection, and is an appealing option to
developers and policy makers. Yet there is fierce debate
concerning the validity of offsetting (Vidal 2014), with
opinions divided among various stakeholders. For
instance, in a recent online public consultation under-
taken by the European Commission, there was an almost
50/50 split between survey respondents who thought bio-
diversity offsetting was appropriate and those who
thought otherwise (European Commission 2015).
Opinions are similarly divided in the scholarly litera-
ture, with some heralding the potential positive gains for
biodiversity from offsetting (Bayon and Jenkins 2010) and
others expressing doubts (Walker et al. 2009). One area of
concern is that offsetting results in poorer environmental
outcomes for legal or political reasons. While biodiversity
offsetting is intended as a “last resort”, to be applied exclu-
sively to residual impacts of a development project after
efforts have been made to avoid and minimize environ-
mental harm (BBOP 2012), political and economic moti-
vations regularly outweigh or undermine environmental
protection (Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2007; Walker et al.
2009; Gordon et al. 2015). From a scientific perspective,
additional concerns include the (in)ability of biodiversity
offsets to achieve genuine compositional and functional
equivalence (Maron et al. 2012).
Some concerns, however, transcend scientific or tech-
nical reasoning. They are ethical in nature and lie at the
heart of the current debate. Many conservation scientists
and environmentalists disagree fundamentally with mar-
ket-based conservation schemes such as biodiversity off-
setting, believing that such approaches are incongruous
with nature’s intrinsic value (McCauley 2006). Yet these
ethical concerns have often been conflated with com-
ments about the technical design of these schemes. For
instance, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to “in-
kind” offsets (ie requiring trades to be of identical type
and location) versus “out-of-kind” offsets (ie permitting
trades between different kinds of ecological entities; Bull
et al. 2013). These dimensions cannot be resolved on eco-
logical grounds alone but relate to the underlying reasons
why we want to conserve biodiversity. The same is true
for the mitigation hierarchy – the sequential procedure of
first avoiding and minimizing biodiversity impacts and
rehabilitating damaged ecosystems, before offsetting the
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In a nutshell:
• Biodiversity offsetting schemes (those that enable biodiver-
sity losses to be compensated by gains elsewhere) have
increased in number globally
• Many questions about the ethics of this approach to conser-
vation are missing from the literature, yet these issues are at
the heart of public debate
• Biodiversity offsetting resonates most strongly with an “out-
comes-based” form of nature conservation, rather than one
focused on regulating actions
• Current schemes do not adequately account for the multiple
values that people assign to biodiversity
• Offsetting may decrease society’s sense of obligation to pro-
tect biodiversity by framing biodiversity destruction as a tech-
nical, economic problem rather than a moral and ethical one
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biodiversity impacts that remain (BBOP 2012). Without
exploring the ethical implications of biodiversity offset-
ting, scientists and policy makers risk evaluating its tech-
nical feasibility rather than its justification according to
the reasons for conservation practice (Sagoff 2013).
Ethical questions that underpin the debate about biodi-
versity offsetting are largely absent in both the academic
literature and public discourse (but see Spash [in press]).
For example, if it is acceptable to offset residual impacts
of a development project, why make any attempt to first
avoid or minimize unnecessary impacts if these too can be
offset without reducing net ecological outcomes? Can the
protection of organisms in one place compensate for the
willful destruction of others at another location? Is it nec-
essary (or possible) to offset the reduction in human well-
being associated with biodiversity loss? If nature is treated
as a tradeable commodity, does this remove an ethical
barrier to its destruction? What does the buying and sell-
ing of biodiversity credits say about our relationship to
the natural world? Here we argue that the legitimacy of
biodiversity offsetting must be evaluated according to
various ethical theories.
n Offsetting reflects a shift in conservation’s ethical
foundations
The imperative to conserve biodiversity can be derived
from multiple ethical bases, yet these are rarely made
explicit within legislation. Thus, the moral legitimacy of
a new legal mechanism for conservation needs to be scru-
tinized according to different schools of ethical thought.
Ethics can be broadly represented by three different
approaches: (1) consequentialist ethics (of which utilitar-
ianism is the dominant form and will be considered here),
which focuses on the expected outcomes of actions; (2)
deontological (or Kantian) ethics, which focuses on the
actions themselves (with actions usually evaluated
according to a rule or rules); and (3) virtue ethics, which
emphasizes the virtues or moral character behind actions.
There is great debate among ethicists concerning which
approach is most robust and useful in different moral con-
texts (Shafer-Landau 2013). With the rise of environ-
mentalism, ethicists have looked to apply such traditional
approaches to new environmental problems. This has
proven challenging because these approaches were devel-
oped to help guide actions that are made by and that
influence humans. For these ethical approaches to inform
behavior toward the environment, either an improved
recognition of the connections between people and
nature is required, or an expansion of moral responsibili-
ties of humans toward the non-human realm is needed
(Sarkar 2012).
Traditional biodiversity legislation has prohibited certain
actions (eg clearing high-quality remnant vegetation or
harming endangered species) according to clearly defined
statutes (eg the “taking” of endangered species under the
US Endangered Species Act; Ruhl 1999). Although
derived from different ethical theories, the justification for
law and policy might find the strongest support from a
deontological framework. Deontological ethics can be
either agent-centered (focused on the person undertaking
an action) or patient-centered (focused on the one being
acted upon). Thus, when applied to the environment, jus-
tification for environmental laws comes from the moral
concept that either people should not harm biodiversity
(agent-centered theory) or the integrity of the environ-
ment should be upheld (patient-centered theory).
Accordingly, the act of destroying biodiversity would have
Figure 1. Increase in offset schemes around the world. The pie chart presents a breakdown of these data by region. Of the
approximately 51 operational schemes (including compulsory and voluntary schemes and those under trial), most have emerged over
the past 10 years. Data were collated via a review of academic and gray literature and consultation with academic experts on
biodiversity offsetting.
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(and indeed has) been considered wrong and to be avoided
where possible, even under challenging circumstances. In
this way, biodiversity legislation is analogous to laws gov-
erning actions toward human beings. For instance, the
crime of assault represents a breaking of the law, irrespec-
tive of any good the perpetrator may have performed
beforehand or that results afterwards.
Given that biodiversity offsetting emphasizes outcomes
rather than the activities that harm biodiversity, this
approach differs from traditional legislation that focuses
on regulating the actions that cause environmental
impacts. With biodiversity offsetting, there is no clear
rule to break; one just has to find an appropriate biodiver-
sity gain that can be traded in compensation for ecologi-
cal losses. This appears to appeal to a utilitarian ethical
justification, but this is not necessarily a problem.
Utilitarian ethics is well-established and has been the
dominant ethical system in the development of Western
liberal democracy and values. Classic utilitarianism
assesses an action based on the expected good that will
result. This requires clear articulation of what constitutes
“good” (eg desire satisfaction or preference fulfillment)
and how it can be valued. This is a key challenge in phi-
losophy but is particularly difficult in the context of
applying utilitarian ethics to biodiversity offsetting for
two reasons. First, scientifically defensible measurements
of biodiversity are needed to determine a unit of trade,
and second, a robust method of determining the value of
a biodiversity unit is required. 
nMeasuring biodiversity
Determining a consistent, interchangeable unit of trade is
especially challenging for biodiversity because it is a com-
plex, dynamic entity composed of multiple concepts such
as species richness and rarity, ecological complementarity
and function, and genetic diversity (Purvis and Hector
2000; Bull et al. 2013). Some biodiversity offsetting
schemes focus on gains and losses in relation to a single
aspect of biodiversity (eg threatened species populations
or habitats), yet this approach can fail to adequately con-
serve the broader ecosystem elements associated with a
species or population. In many other cases, metrics of
trade are based on a biodiversity “score” (eg “habitat
hectares”; Parkes et al. 2003), which is used to trade bio-
diversity “units” to achieve a predefined objective (eg net
gain or no net loss). This method of ecological account-
ing is of practical convenience since it allows patches of
habitat to be traded, irrespective of ecological differences.
However, by conflating the many attributes of biodiver-
sity, this practice ignores the fact that “biodiversity can-
not be reduced sensibly to a single number” (Purvis and
Hector 2000). Some schemes have addressed this issue by
prohibiting trading between different ecosystem types
(out-of-kind compensation), yet ecological equivalence is
difficult to achieve even with this restriction in place
(Bull et al. 2013). Ultimately, defining a unit of trade is so
challenging because it is not an ecological question.
Rather, it is connected to the underlying motivations for
protecting biodiversity, which are often difficult to articu-
late (Miller et al. 2011).
The very presence of the mitigation hierarchy highlights
a lack of confidence in the ability of current assessment
methods to measure biodiversity adequately and capture its
importance. Proponents of biodiversity offsetting argue
that it should only be applied to residual or “unavoidable”
impacts from a development project. Yet to date, there has
been no clear ethical explanation for why offsetting should
function only as a “last resort” within the mitigation hier-
archy. If (1) scientific measurements of biodiversity are
equated with their importance, (2) biodiversity is mea-
sured accurately, and (3) measured losses are adequately
compensated for, then the requirement to first avoid and
minimize impacts or restore biodiversity onsite might
appear unnecessary. The absence of a transparent, logical
basis for the mitigation hierarchy is leading to a slackening
of the requirements, particularly when the economic costs
of avoiding or minimizing impacts to biodiversity far out-
weigh those related to offsetting. Permitting offsetting
without reference to ethical reasons why it should be used
to compensate for unavoidable impacts alone is resulting in
offset gains being used to justify impacts that previously
would not have been acceptable.
Uneasiness about the ability of existing metrics to
measure the importance of biodiversity appropriately is
also revealed through legal stipulations about what
types of impacts (or ecological entities) can or cannot
be offset. Many jurisdictions prevent offsetting of
impacts to threatened species or habitats. In this way,
these offset policies are something of a hybrid of utili-
tarian ethics (they permit biodiversity impacts yet
maintain environmental “values” through compensa-
tion) and deontological ethics (certain types of biodi-
versity are off-limits). Again, a lack of philosophical
clarity has led to a gradual shift between these two
stances over time as restrictions are removed. In
Australia, a leading jurisdiction in the implementation
of offsets, the practice of trading biodiversity was ini-
tially highly conservative. Offsetting was applicable
only for impacts on common vegetation types, requir-
ing improvements in equivalent communities (like-for-
like offsetting) (Victorian Government 2002). After
increasing pressure from industry, out-of-kind offsets (ie
gains in a different community type) were permitted,
along with offsetting of listed threatened species, even
those that are critically endangered. Today, biodiversity
offset credits in some parts of Australia can be pur-
chased “over the counter” and can comprise entirely
disparate entities. For example, the impacts of a port
development on endangered dugongs (Dugong dugon)
have been offset (in part) by signage to encourage
recreational boat users to decrease their speed to reduce
the likelihood or severity of boat strikes (Figure 2;
Gladstone Ports Corporation 2012).
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n Scientific equivalence is not value equivalence
Even if it were possible to determine a consistent unit to
evaluate ecological equivalence between biodiversity
impacts and biodiversity offsets, this still would not be a
sufficient utilitarian ethical justification of biodiversity
offsetting. According to utilitarian ethics, for an outcome
to be morally valid, it is not the scientific equivalence
that matters, but value equivalence. This would require
consideration of which values are relevant, and whose val-
ues should be taken into account. 
People assign a range of use and non-use values to
nature, including subsistence, economic, aesthetic, thera-
peutic, and bequest value (UNEP 2005). Thus, many
people may object to offset agreements not only because
different biodiversity features are incomparable scientifi-
cally but also because the offsets and losses are not per-
ceived to have the same value. Moreover, the values of
ecosystems that commonly matter most to people – such
as aesthetic beauty, cultural importance, opportunities for
social interaction, or existence value (simply knowing it
is there) – are intangible and difficult to quantify (Kenter
et al. 2015). These values are rarely, if ever, accounted for
in biodiversity offsetting and may require qualitative
rather than quantitative techniques for adequate assess-
ment. Of course, if one considers nature to possess intrin-
sic value (that is, its value is independent of a valuer; see
Vucetich et al. 2015), then biodiversity offsetting may be
impractical because intrinsic values cannot be measured,
prioritized, or traded off (Justus et al. 2009). In some ways,
the challenge of capturing the values of biodiversity is an
expression of the cost–benefit analysis quandary in envi-
ronmental management, whereby the aggregation of indi-
vidual stated preferences according to utilitarian eco-
nomic theory does not result in ultimately desirable and
just public outcomes (see, for example, Sagoff 2008).
Biodiversity offsetting has been compared to carbon
offsetting – an approach that, while contentious, is con-
sidered by many scholars to be the most efficient way of
curbing atmospheric carbon emissions. However, biodi-
versity is quite unlike carbon. Trading metric tons of car-
bon is simple ethically because carbon molecules gener-
ally do not matter to people. The value that is assigned to
carbon is representative of its influence on other things
that are valued, such as human life, ecological outcomes,
and economic systems. Applying a market mechanism to
biodiversity is much more ethically complex because bio-
diversity itself is valued by people and because values asso-
ciated with biodiversity typically pertain to specific
species, habitats, and ecosystems. 
Another key consideration, according to utilitarian
ethics, is whose values are considered in a decision. Using
ecological features alone to calculate numerical scores for
habitat patches assumes that biodiversity is valued
equally everywhere by everyone. Of course, this assump-
tion is inappropriate, given that different people will
assign greater or lesser value to biodiversity for many rea-
sons beyond its ecological condition or composition.
Indeed, people’s attachment to specific places is often
very strong (Low and Altman 1992) and is related to
unique meanings that certainly cannot be traded between
different locations. Consider the offsetting of biodiversity
losses on the fringes of urban settlements arising from
Figure 2. Impacts to dugongs (a) from a port development in
Gladstone Harbour, Australia, have been offset using out-of-
kind gains. The scale of the impacts to the system is clear when
comparing photographs from before (b) and after (c) the
development.
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new housing developments (Bekessy et al. 2010).
Creating offset sites away from where the biodiversity is
being destroyed means that nature-based recreation and
environmental education opportunities are lost, natural
amenities and environmental health are reduced, and
places that shaped unique memories are markedly trans-
formed (Figure 3). It is therefore unlikely that the offset
sites will be valued in the same way or to the same degree
as the original biodiversity located close to where people
live. Furthermore, while the economic and social gains
resulting from development projects may appear very
large, they are typically concentrated to a small number
of people. In contrast, the instrumental values of natural
ecosystems are typically diffuse yet benefit many
(Rolston 1988).
Is it possible to adequately account for the range of val-
ues that are associated with biodiversity in order for off-
setting to be ethically viable? While recent progress has
been made in ecosystem services research along these
lines (Daniel et al. 2012; Jax et al. 2013), assessing the
diversity of values that people relate to biodiversity
remains a daunting task and currently no biodiversity off-
setting scheme comes close to doing so.
n Offsetting may undermine environmental virtues
Allowing for the buying and selling of nature may coun-
teract the development of respectful, positive societal
attitudes toward nature: the motivation for conserva-
tion according to a virtue ethics framework. Hursthouse
(2007) noted that environmentalists routinely identify
traditional vices, such as greed and self-indulgence, as
underpinning environmental prob-
lems. She argued for a new “virtue” –
respect for nature – which, if pursued,
could help prevent environmental
degradation, including biodiversity
loss. While offsetting might make it
economically less viable to destroy
biodiversity, it rests on the assump-
tion that there is nothing wrong per
se with the manipulation and trading
of nature, and may therefore under-
mine such a virtue. This danger is
highlighted by Goodin (1994), who
drew a comparison between the mon-
etization of nature and the selling of
“indulgences” by Catholic clergy in
the Middle Ages, whereby monetary
payment was given in remittance for
sinful living.
A utilitarian ethic for environmen-
tal protection may actually exacerbate
environmental harm. In their study of
childcare centers in Israel, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000) showed that the
introduction of late pick-up fees
resulted in more parents arriving late to collect their chil-
dren: a trend that persisted even when the fee was abol-
ished. Commodification of the “late pick-up service”
changed the ethical basis for punctuality from a respect
for the teacher to a market based on a willingness to pay
for a service. In the same way, offsetting schemes may be
less effective at preventing the loss of biodiversity
because there can be no “guilt” attached to the act of buy-
ing a commodity at will (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). 
n Conclusion
Biodiversity offsetting has flourished recently but repre-
sents an ethical approach to protecting nature different
from that of traditional conservation legislation. Instead
of permitting or restricting actions, offsetting is based on
maintaining overall ecological value. Even if one does
not object fundamentally to the trading of nature, offset-
ting policies remain problematic because they do not
measure the range of values that people associate with
biodiversity. Ironically, offsetting may exacerbate envi-
ronmental harm because it removes an important ethical
roadblock to its destruction. It is critical therefore to con-
sider the ethical implications of this change. Indeed, off-
setting raises broader questions about how we should
measure impacts to biodiversity, the level of impact we
are willing to accept, and what motivates our desire to
avoid such impacts. Thus, rather than accepting the
inevitable rise of biodiversity offsetting, perhaps it is time
to reassess conservation’s ethical foundations to ensure
that the systems designed to conserve biodiversity are
protecting what really matters.
Figure 3. A residential development site in northern Melbourne, Australia, whereby
impacts to the grassland ecosystem were offset elsewhere. Installations of metal wildlife-
themed statues as part of an interpretive walk only serve to highlight the loss of
biodiversity from the area.
C 
Sp
ee
d
CD Ives and SA Bekessy The ethics of offsetting nature
573
© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org
n Acknowledgements
CDI and SAB thank M Colyvan for insights and helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. M Hardy
assisted with background research on global offset
schemes. J Bull, A Gordon, D Keith, and M Maron
helped in collating data for Figure 1. The graphic in
Figure 1 was designed by TBJ Creative. SAB is supported
by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future
Fellowship. This research was conducted with funding
from the ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental
Decisions and the Australian Government’s National
Environmental Science Programme.
n References
Bayon R and Jenkins M. 2010. The business of biodiversity. Nature
466: 184–85.
BBOP (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme). 2012.
Standard on biodiversity offsets. Washington, DC: BBOP.
http://bbop.forest-trends.org/guidelines/Standard.pdf. Viewed
28 Sep 2015.
Bekessy SA, Wintle BA, Lindenmayer DB, et al. 2010. The biodi-
versity bank cannot be a lending bank. Conserv Lett 3: 151–58.
Bull JW, Suttle KB, Gordon A, et al. 2013. Biodiversity offsets in
theory and practice. Oryx 47: 369–80.
Daniel TC, Muhar A, Arnberger A, et al. 2012. Contributions of
cultural services to the ecosystem services agenda. P Natl Acad
Sci USA 109: 8812–19.
European Commission. 2015. Results of the no net loss public
consultation. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/bio
diversity/nnl/results_en.htm. Viewed 15 May 2015.
Gibbons P and Lindenmayer DB. 2007. Offsets for land clearing:
no net loss or the tail wagging the dog? Ecol Manag Restor 8:
26–31.
Gladstone Ports Corporation. 2012. Western Basin Dredging and
Disposal Project: Biodiversity Offset Strategy. Gladstone,
Australia: Gladstone Ports Corporation Limited. www.western
basinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Biodiversity%20Offset
%20Strategy%20Version%206%20for%20web.pdf. Viewed 28
Sep 2015.
Gneezy U and Rustichini A. 2000. A fine is a price. J Legal Stud 29:
1–17.
Goodin R. 1994. Selling environmental indulgences. Kyklos 47:
573–96.
Gordon A, Bull JW, Wilcox C, and Maron M. 2015. Perverse
incentives risk undermining biodiversity offset policies. J Appl
Ecol 52: 532–37.
Hursthouse R. 2007. Environmental virtue ethics. In: Walker RL
and Ivanhoe PJ (Eds). Working virtue: virtue ethics and con-
temporary moral problems. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Jax K, Barton DN, Chan KMA, et al. 2013. Ecosystem services and
ethics. Ecol Econ 93: 260–68.
Justus J, Colyvan M, Regan H, and Maguire L. 2009. Buying into
conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value. Trends Ecol
Evol 24: 187–91.
Kenter JO, O’Brien L, Hockley N, et al. 2015. What are shared and
social values of ecosystems? Ecol Econ 111: 86–99.
Low SM and Altman I. 1992. Place attachment. New York, NY:
Plenum Press.
Maron M, Hobbs RJ, Moilanen A, et al. 2012. Faustian bargains?
Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity offset poli-
cies. Biol Conserv 155: 141–48.
McCauley DJ. 2006. Selling out on nature. Nature 443: 27–28.
Miller TR, Minteer BA, and Malan LC. 2011. The new conserva-
tion debate: the view from practical ethics. Biol Conserv 144:
948–57.
Parkes D, Newell G, and Cheal D. 2003. Assessing the quality of
native vegetation: the “habitat hectares” approach. Ecol Manag
Restor 4: 29–38.
Purvis A and Hector A. 2000. Getting the measure of biodiversity.
Nature 405: 212–19.
Rolston III H. 1988. Environmental ethics: duties to and values in
the natural world. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Ruhl JB. 1999. How to kill endangered species, legally: the nuts
and bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for real
estate development. Environ Lawyer 5: 345–406.
Sagoff M. 2008. At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or why polit-
ical questions are not all economic. In: Sagoff M. The economy
of the Earth: philosophy, law, and the environment (2nd edn).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sagoff M. 2013. What does environmental protection protect?
Ethics Policy Environ 16: 239–57.
Sarkar S. 2012. Environmental philosophy: from theory to prac-
tice. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Shafer-Landau R (Ed). 2013. Ethical theory: an anthology (2nd
edn). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Spash CL. Bulldozing biodiversity: the economics of offsets and
trading-in Nature. Biol Conserv; doi:10.1016/j.biocon.
2015.07.037. In press.
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2005.
Concepts of ecosystem value and valuation approaches. In:
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and human
well-being: a framework for assessment. Washington, DC:
Island Press. www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.
304.aspx.pdf. Viewed 28 Sep 2015.
Victorian Government. 2002. Native vegetation management: a
framework for action. www.spiffa.org/uploads/2/6/7/5/2675656/
nativevegetationmanagement-aframeworkforaction.pdf.
Viewed 28 Sep 2015.
Vidal J. 2014. Conservationists split over ‘biodiversity offsetting’
plans. The Guardian. 4 Jun 2014. www.theguardian.com/
environment/2014/jun/03/conservationists-split-over-biodiver
sity-offsetting-plans. Viewed 28 Sep 2015.
Vucetich JA, Bruskotter JT, and Nelson MP. 2015. Evaluating
whether nature’s intrinsic value is an axiom of or anathema to
conservation. Conserv Biol 29: 321–32.
Walker S, Brower AL, Stephens RTT, and Lee WG. 2009. Why
bartering biodiversity fails. Conserv Lett 2: 149–57.
Eb
Db
Mb
Ab
Nb
Ub
Sb
Cb
Rb
I Pb
